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The Impact of Section 547 of the Bankruptcy
Code upon Secured and Unsecured
Creditors
Thomas Ross*
Drafters of a new statute inevitably speculate about its fu-
ture impact. These speculations in turn lead to assumptions
that ultimately become the premises of the argument by which
the statute will be justified. Once a statute is enacted, however,
the first wave of criticism is commonly based on counter-specu-
lation. Some critics may argue that the drafters failed to antici-
pate all the effects of the statute and that the effects they
overlooked will be undesirable. Other critics may contend that
the assumed effects, although desirable, will not materialize.
It is difficult for both drafters and critics to accurately pre-
dict the impact of a new statute, however, because its effects
will inevitably be determined by the environment in which it
operates. A statute's effects depend in large part on the mean-
ing given its language. Courts may interpret or apply a statute
in ways not foreseen by its drafters, resulting in unexpected ef-
fects.' In addition, individuals affected by the statute may react
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. I
am indebted to Professor Dennis R. Honabach for his thoughtful commentary
on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. In re Harter, 10 Bankr. 272 (Bankr. N.D. Ind 1981), provides an appar-
ent example of judicial interpretation that is contrary to the drafters' intended
meaning. Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the "Code"), 11
U.S.C. § 541 (1982), defines the bankruptcy estate. With some exceptions not
relevant here, § 541(a) includes in the bankruptcy estate "all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." 11
U.S.C. § 541(a) (1) (1982). Thus, § 541 "includes as property of the estate all
property of the debtor, even that needed for a fresh start. After the property
comes into the estate, then the debtor is permitted to exempt it. . ." S. REP.
No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
5787, 5868. The Harter court, after quoting the above legislative history, held
that the debtor's army retirement benefits were not part of the § 541 "estate,"
reasoning that the benefits were, in effect, future wages and therefore not prop-
erty in which the debtor had an interest under § 541(a) (1). Yet, the statutory
provision concerning future wages (not cited by the court) excludes "earnings
from services performed by an individual debtor after the commencement of the
case." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (6) (1982) (emphasis added). The pension benefits did
not fit within the language of the statutory exclusion. Apparently, the court
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by changing their behavior in ways not anticipated by the stat-
ute's drafters.2 Finally, the values of the society in which the
statute operates may evolve, and this too may affect the stat-
ute's operation. 3
This Article examines a statutory provision in its youth-
section 547 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.4 In particu-
lar, it will consider the effect of section 547 on inventory and ac-
counts receivable financing. The drafters of section 547 and
concluded that the benefits were essential to the debtor's fresh start and, be-
cause they could not be exempted, used the concept of "property" to enable the
debtor to keep his benefits, notwithstanding the statutory language and legisla-
tive history.
2. For example, professionally counseled taxpayers may adjust their be-
havior annually to avoid the intended revenue effects of various tax statutes.
The story of the "floating lien" of article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, a
central concept of this Article, may provide another example. Under article 9, a
creditor may, in theory at least, take a security interest in all of the debtor's
property, then owned or thereafter acquired, to secure all loans by the creditor,
then made or thereafter advanced, pay no further attention to the debtor's af-
fairs, and be assured of a priority position in the debtor's property should the
debtor subsequently default. The "floating lien" of article 9 was intended to fa-
cilitate commercial transactions and to simplify the hodgepodge of pre-article 9
personal property security law. The principal drafter of article 9, Professor
Grant Gilmore, hoped, and expected, that creditors would not encumber exces-
sively the debtor's property with this easy-to-attach "floating lien" and that
creditors would continue to monitor the business health of the debtor. See I G.
GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 11.7, at 359-65 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS]. Sixteen years later, Pro-
fessor Gilmore concluded that creditor behavior had thwarted his expectations.
In his view, secured creditors had used article 9 to tie up all of the debtor's as-
sets and to deny unsecured creditors anything more than a pittance in bank-
ruptcy. See Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform
Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L REV. 605,
625-29 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Gilmore, Confessions of a Repentant
Draftsman].
3. See generally G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw (1977).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982). Section 547 provides:
(a) In this section-
(1) "inventory" means personal property leased or furnished,
held for sale or lease, or to be furnished under a contract for service,
raw materials, work in process, or materials used or consumed in a
business, including farm products such as crops or livestock, held for
sale or lease;
(2) "new value" means money or money's worth in goods, serv-
ices, or new credit, or release by a transferee of property previously
transferred to such transferee in a transaction that is neither void
nor voidable by the debtor or the trustee under any applicable law,
but does not include an obligation substituted for an existing obliga-
tion;
(3) "receivable" means right to payment, whether or not such
right has been earned by performance; and
(4) a debt for a tax is incurred on the day when such tax is last
payable, including any extension, without penalty.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the
trustee may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor-
[Vol. 69:39
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some of its early critics assumed that it would affect the pat-
tern of distributions to creditors in bankruptcy. Specifically,
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor,
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor
before such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the pe-
tition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing
of the petition, if such creditor, at the time of such transfer-
(i) was an insider; and
(ii) had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insol-
vent at the time of such transfer; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor
would receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent
-provided by the provisions of this title.
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(1) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose
benefit such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange
for new value given to the debtor, and
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange;
(2) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) in payment of a debt incurred in the ordinary course of
business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made not later than 45 days after such debt was incurred,
(C) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs
of the debtor and the transferee; and
(D) made according to ordinary business terms;
(3) of a security interest in property acquired by the debtor-
(A) to the extent such security interest secures new value that
was-
(i) given at or after the signing of a security agreement that
contains a description of such property as collateral;
(ii) given by or on behalf of the secured party under such
agreement-
(iii) given to enable the debtor to acquire such property, and
(iv) in fact used by the debtor to acquire such property; and
(B) that is perfected before 10 days after such security interest
attaches;
(4) to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such
transfer, such creditor gave new value to or for the benefit of the
debtor-
(A) not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security interest;
and
(B) on account of which new value the debtor did not make an
otherwise unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of such
creditor;
(5) of a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable or
the proceeds of either, except to the extent that the aggregate of all
such transfers to the transferee caused a reduction, as of the date of
the filing of the petition and to the prejudice of other creditors hold-
ing unsecured claims, of any amount by which the debt secured by
such security interest exceeded the value of all security interest for
such debt on the later of-
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they supposed that the trustee in bankruptcy would use sec-
tion 547 to avoid security interests in inventory and accounts
receivable. It was hoped that these assets would become a
source of enhanced bankruptcy distributions to unsecured
creditors.5 This assumption, however, proved to be mistaken.
(A) (i) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b) (4) (A)
of this section applies, 90 days before the date of the filing of the
petition; or
(ii) with respect to a transfer to which subsection
(b) (4) (B) of this section applies, one year before the date of the
filing of the petition; and
(B) the date on which new value was first given under the se-
curity agreement creating such security interest; or
(6) that is the fixing of a statutory lien that is not avoidable
under section 545 of this title.
(d) A trustee may avoid a transfer of property of the debtor trans-
ferred to secure reimbursement of a surety that furnished a bond or
other obligation to dissolve a judicial lien that would have been avoida-
ble by the trustee under subsection (b) of this section. The liability of
such surety under such bond or obligation shall be discharged to the
extent of the value of such property recovered by the trustee or the
amount paid to the trustee.
(e) (1) For the purposes of this section-
(A) a transfer of real property other than fixtures, but includ-
ing the interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the
sale of real property, is perfected when a bona fide purchaser of
such property from the debtor against whom applicable law per-
mits such transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest that
is superior to the interest of the transferee; and
(B) a transfer of a fixture or property other than real property
is perfected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a
judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee.
(2) For the purposes of this section, except as provided in para-
graph (3) of this subsection, a transfer is made-
(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the trans-
feror and the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within
10 days after, such time;
(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is
perfected after such 10 days; or
(C) immediately before the date of the filing of the petition, if
such transfer is not perfected at the later of-
(i) the commencement of the case; and
(ii) 10 days after such transfer takes effect between the
transferor and the transferee.
(3) For the purposes of this section, a transfer is not made until
the debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred.
(f) For the purposes of this section, the debtor is presumed to
have been insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding
the date of the filing of the petition.
Pub. L 95-598, 92 Stat. 2597(1978).
5. See H. R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 179, 204-19, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6164-79 (REPORT OF THE COMMrrrEE ON CO-
ORDINATION OF THE BANKRuPrcy AcT AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE)
[hereinafter cited as COMMITrEE REPORT]. The Committee, responsible for the
initial draft of what was to become § 547, characterized its effort as a "rescue
mission for unsecured creditors." Id. at 208, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 6168. See also Jackson & Kronman, Voidable Preferences and Protection of
the Expectation Interest 60 MnN. L. REV. 971 (1976); Kronman, The Treatment
[Vol. 69:39
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Creditors with perfected security interests in inventory or ac-
counts have little to fear from the potential application of sec-
tion 547. The assumed change in bankruptcy distributions has
not occurred, and probably will not. If anything, section 547 has
exacerbated the plight of the unsecured creditor in bankruptcy.
A review of the evolving case law will demonstrate the error in
the assumption, as will a consideration of commercial practices
and bankruptcy principles.
This Article consists of four parts. Part I discusses the na-
ture and evolution of the basic assumption. Part H reviews the
evolving case law under section 547. Part III discusses certain
commercial practices and bankruptcy principles that undercut
the basic assumption. Finally, this Article concludes that al-
though section 547 is based on a mistaken assumption, for the
reasons discussed it should not be amended.
L THE NATURE AND EVOLUTION OF THE BASIC
ASSUMPT[ON
A thorough retelling of the history underlying the drafting
of section 547 would be duplicative and unnecessary;6 certain
of Security Interests in After-Acquired Property Under the Proposed Bank-
ruptcy Ac 124 U. PA. L REv. 110 (1975).
Professor Grant Gilmore, Chairman of the Committee, subsequently re-
ferred to § 547 in the following stirring terms:
Just as, in nineteenth-century melodramas, the United States Cavalry
always arrived in the nick of time, so the new Federal Bankruptcy
Code has come galloping to the rescue. The Bankruptcy Code greatly
increases the power of the bankruptcy courts to control the distribu-
tion or reorganization of insolvent estates. In particular, the new sec-
tion on voidable preferences-section 547-significantly cuts back the
rights of article 9 secured parties.
Gilmore, Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, supra note 2, at 627-28.
Section 547 might also be explained as a statutory means of encouraging
inventory and accounts receivable lenders to police their debtors. The term
"police" as used here refers to a creditor's monitoring of the activities of its
debtors to assure compliance with the terms of the loan agreement and to dis-
cern promptly any signs of financial distress. The virtue of policing, it has been
suggested, is that early detection of financial distress permits the creditor to
engage in one of two desirable courses of conduct. First, the creditor might en-
gage in a timely salvage operation, including perhaps a refinancing of the debt.
Second, if the creditor concluded that the debtor was beyond salvage, it would
be able to "pull the plug" sooner rather than later. If, as is commonly sup-
posed, debtors heading into bankruptcy incur increasingly more unsecured
(and ultimately unpaid) debts, an earlier bankruptcy filing is to be preferred.
See 1 GILoRE, SECURrT bfranESTS, supra note 2, § 8.3. The policing incentive
effect depends upon the significance of the § 547 threat to the inventory and ac-
counts lender. Because, as this Article concludes, that threat is minimal, the
policing incentive effect will probably not be realized.
6. See Breitowitz, Article 9 Security Interests As Voidable Preferences (pt.
1), 3 CARnOZO I REv. 357,358-61 (1982); Countryman, Bankruptcy Preferences-
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pieces of the story, however, must be understood. In 1966 the
National Bankruptcy Conference established a Committee on
Coordination of the Bankruptcy Act and the Uniform Commer-
cial Code (the "Committee").7 As a part of the redrafting of the
bankruptcy act, the Committee considered the treatment of se-
curity interests in real and personal property in the bankruptcy
context.
The Committee could have addressed the treatment of se-
curity interests in bankruptcy in a straightforward way,
describing affirmatively which security interests would be
honored in bankruptcy. Instead, the Committee chose to focus
on the voidable preference concept which had become, under
the existing law, "the principal conduit for discussion of the ex-
tent to which security interests were (or should be) good
against or voidable by the trustee in bankruptcy." 8 Thus, the
Committee chose to redraft the voidable preferences section of
the proposed bankruptcy act, the section that was eventually
enacted as section 547.
Preference law, a feature of both the old bankruptcy act
(the "Act") and the new bankruptcy code (the "Code"), is pre-
mised on the notion that certain transfers of debtors' property
from debtors to creditors within a specified period of time prior
to the filing of a bankruptcy petition may be undone in bank-
ruptcy.9 A creditor who has received a preferential transfer
must return the property transferred or its value to the bank-
ruptcy estate, where the recaptured property becomes avail-
Current Law and Proposed Changes, 11 U.C.C. L.J. 95, 105 (1978); Jackson &
Kronman, supra note 5, at 971-76.
7. The Committee, chaired by Professor Grant Gilmore, was composed of
Herbert H. Anderson, Peter F. Coogan, Vern Countryman, Leon S. Forman,
Frank Kennedy, Harold Marsh, Stefan A. Riesenfeld, George M. Treister, and
Elmore Whitehurst. COMMIrrrEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 219, 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6179. Professor Homer Kripke, although not a formal
member of the Committee, participated in the Committee's discussions. Id. at
205, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6165. The draft that emerged from this
Committee was adopted in substance by the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 170 (1973).
Congress created the Committee to study and recommend changes in the
bankruptcy law. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468. With sig-
nificant changes in language and some substantive alteration (discussed irnfra
text accompanying notes 32-34), the Committee's proposal became § 547.
8. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5 at 204, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6164.
9. For a summary of the historical development of preference law, see
McCoid, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of Doubt, 67
VA. L. REV. 249, 250-59 (1981).
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able for distribution to creditors generally.'0
Traditionally, preference law has been justified by several
policies." First, it facilitates a more equal distribution of the
debtor's property. Second, it discourages the dismemberment
of ailing, but salvageable, debtors. When creditors are grabbing
for their piece of a debtor, a debtor's recovery can be fore-
closed. The specter of preference discourages grabbing and fa-
cilitates a debtor's recovery.'2 Finally, preference law enhances
bankruptcy distributions to creditors as a group. This mitigates
the financial loss to creditors and thereby reduces the social
costs of bankruptcy.13 These standard justifications, although
questionable, have nonetheless carried the day.' 4
Preference law thus formed the framework for the Commit-
tee's debate. The Committee had to determine the extent to
which secured creditors would be vulnerable to preferential
avoidance of their security interests. In 1970 the Committee is-
sued its final report and final draft of the proposed preferences
10. See 11 U.S.C. § 550 (1982).
11. See generally Jackson & Kronman, supra note 5, at 975-76; McCoid,
supra note 9, at 259-61; Nimmer, Security Interests in Bankruptcy: An Overview
of Section 547 of the Code, 17 Hous. L. REv. 289, 291-94 (1980).
12. Although dismemberment is deemed undesirable in the preference
analysis, the same phenomenon by another name is touted as desirable in a
different commercial context. Prior to the enactment of article 9, creditors with
security interests in a debtor's accounts were required to "police" the debtor
pursuant to the rule of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925). To "police" ef-
fectively under the Benedict rule, the creditor had to exercise some dominion
over the accounts and proceeds of the accounts. For example, a creditor typi-
cally might require that all proceeds be remitted to the debtor. This policing
gave the creditor a vantage point from which to discern early on the debtor's
financial distress. After concluding that a debtor is in trouble, the creditor
could either engage in a salvage operation or demand repayment of the loan.
Demanding repayment typically would drive the debtor into bankruptcy. Al-
though this is a form of dismemberment, some have argued that "pulling the
plug" on debtors in this manner is desirable. The financially distressed debtor
typically piles up ever-increasing unsecured debt as it slides into bankruptcy.
Pulling the plug sooner rather than later stops the accumulation of unsecured
(and ultimately unpaid) debt. See 1 GELsom, SEcunrry INTERESTS, supra note
2, § 8.3, at 257-61.
13. See Jackson and Kronman, supra note 5, at 989-90; McCoid, supra note
9, at 261.
14. See generally McCoid, supra note 9. Although preference law was his-
torically aimed at preventing fraud, § 547 (both in its earlier drafts and as en-
acted) does not require fraudulent intent on the part of the debtor or the
creditor. The rationales offered include assuring equality in the distributions to
creditors, increasing the bankruptcy estate and thereby lessening the blow to
the creditors as a group, and discouraging the "dismemberment" of the debtor
on the eve of bankruptcy. This Article does not address the persuasiveness or
accuracy of these general rationales.
1984]
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section.15 Although the specific language of section 547 bears
little resemblance to the Committee's original draft, section 547
does carry forward the Committee's basic approach. Thus, to
understand the purposes and assumptions underlying section
547, it is necessary to understand the Committee's perspective.
When the Committee was empaneled, the validity of secur-
ity interests in personal property in the bankruptcy context
was uncertain. The law of security interests in personal prop-
erty was embodied in article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.16 The existing bankruptcy law was erected by reference
to the pre-article 9 system of security law. Although article 9
adopted most of the basic principles of the pre-Code security
law,17 it differed in one important respect. Article 9 explicitly
validated the "floating lien," a lien that covers property to be
acquired by the debtor in the future ("after-acquired prop-
erty") and secures loans to be made by the creditor in the fu-
ture ("future advances").18 Commentators suggested that the
article 9 floating lien, particularly as it relates to after-acquired
property, was wholly vulnerable to a trustee's attack under the
Act's preference provisions.19 Under this interpretation, a se-
curity interest in the after-acquired property was deemed a
"transfer" to the creditor as of the time of the debtor's acquisi-
tion of the property. If this transfer occurred within the prefer-
ence period, the trustee might avoid the transfer resulting in
the loss to the creditor of its security interest in the property.20
Thus, security interests in all property acquired by the debtor
within the preference period, the four months preceding the
bankruptcy filing, might be undone.21
15. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 204, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6164.
16. All references to the Uniform Commercial Code, unless otherwise indi-
cated, are to the 1978 Official Text and Comments. The definitive work on the
history, drafting, and philosophy of article 9 is Professor Grant Gilmore's two-
volume work, SECuRrrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, supra note 2. For an
ongoing analysis of article 9 as it has evolved, see P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN, D.
VAGTS & J. McDoNNELL, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE (1983).
17. "Article 9 is not so much a new start or a fresh approach as it is a re-
flection of work long since accomplished." 1 GILMORE, SECURIrY INTERESTS,
supra note 2, § 9.1, at 290.
18. See U.C.C. § 9-204; 1 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS, supra note 2, § 11.7.
19. See, e.g., Countryman, Code Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 75 COM.
LJ. 269 (1970).
20. See 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1976) (Bankruptcy Code of 1898, ch. 541, § 60, 30 Stat.
562, amended by Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 869 (1938)) (repealed 1978).
21. Under the old Act, a preferential transfer was avoidable by the trustee
only if the creditor, at the time of the transfer, had reasonable cause to believe
that the debtor was insolvent. Thus, a trustee who was unable to make the
[Vol. 69:39
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This specter was particularly frightening to creditors hold-
ing security interests in the debtor's inventory or accounts re-
ceivable. Inventory and accounts receivable by their nature are
constantly fluctuating-inventory is sold and replaced with new
inventory accounts are paid, and new ones arise.22 Conceiva-
bly, all of a debtor's inventory or accounts could arise within
the four months preceding a bankruptcy filing. In that event.
the trustee might avoid the creditor's entire security interest,
relegating the creditor to the status of a general, unsecured
creditor, who typically receives a mere pittance in
bankruptcy.23
Several opinions in the late 1960's and early 1970's, how-
ever, gave solace to the secured creditor.24 These cases upheld
the floating lien and its after-acquired property clause in bank-
ruptcy preference attacks. The most expansive and noted case
is DuBay v. Williams.25 The relevant creditor in DuBay had a
perfected security interest in the debtor's accounts. Although
most, if not all, of the accounts arose within the preference pe-
riod, the court upheld the security interest. The DuBay court
reached this result by interpreting a part of the preference sec-
tion of the Act. Section 60a(2) of the Act provided that "a
transfer of property ... shall be deemed to have been made or
suffered at the time it became so far perfected that no subse-
quent lien upon such property obtainable by legal or equitable
proceedings on a simple contract could become superior to the
"reasonable cause" showing would not be able to avoid the creditor's security
interest, even as to after-acquired property. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30
Stat. 544, amended by Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 869 (1938) (repealed
1978). See infra text accompanying notes 62-64.
22. See Kronman, supra note 5, at 119.
23. See, e.g., T. EISENBERG, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAw 439 (1984) (noting that
in fiscal year 1977, unsecured creditors recovered only about five per cent of
their allowed claims).
24. See, e.g., In re Wilco Forest Mach., Inc., 491 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1974); In
re King-Porter Co., 446 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1971); Grain Merchants of Ind. v. Union
Bank & Say. Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1969); Owen v. McKesson & Robbins
Drug Co., 349 F. Supp. 1327 (N.D. Fla. 1972), aj'd mem., 486 F.2d 1401 (5th Cir.
1973); In re Nickerson & Nickerson, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 93 (D. Neb. 1971), affd per
curiam, 452 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1971); Biggins v. Southwest Bank, 322 F. Supp. 93
(D. Neb. 1971), affd, 490 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1973); In re Portland Newspaper
Publishing Co., 271 F. Supp. 395 (D. Or. 1967), affd sub nom. DuBay v. Williams,
417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969).
25. 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969). The district court decision in the DuBay
case is analyzed in Gordon, Commercial Transactions-Secured Transactions
Under The Uniform Commercial Code-Section 9-108,22 ARm. L REV. 501 (1968).
The case is also noted in 1 GA. L RE V. 257 (1967); 16 U. KANe. L REv. 1004 (1968);
28 MVD. I REV. 78 (1968); 65 MicH. L REV. 1004 (1967); 42 N.Y.U. L REV. 150
(1967); 44 TE7. L. REV. 1369 (1966); and 1968 Wis. L REV. 246.
1984]
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rights of the transferee." Under article 9 a secured creditor
with a perfected "floating lien" on a debtor's accounts has pri-
ority over subsequent lien creditors. The DuBay court there-
fore concluded that the "transfer," for preference analysis
purposes, occurred at the moment of perfection, even though
the relevant accounts did not exist at the moment of perfection.
The DuBay interpretation, if carried to its logical extreme,
would have insulated all article 9 interests in after-acquired
property from preferential avoidance. 26 As the Committee re-
ported, "If the Ninth Circuit's DuBay opinion, read in the man-
ner suggested, is to be taken as the end of the matter, secured
parties can take blanket liens on all the present and future per-
sonal property of their debtors, make no further advances and
sleep peacefully in the assurance that, on bankruptcy day, all
the assets will come to them."27
Concluding that DuBay overly protected the interests of
secured parties, the Committee sought to create an intermedi-
ate position that would give some protection to the expectation
interest of the secured creditor and yet result in some level of
avoidance, thereby providing a measure of meaningful relief to
unsecured creditors. 28 Focusing on security interests in inven-
tory and accounts receivable, "the heart of the matter,"29 the
Committee created a position that combined a "two point mea-
surement system" with an "improvement of position" test:
What has been referred to as a "two point measurement system" is set
up. The two measuring points are (1) four months before the date of
filing the bankruptcy petition and (2) the date of filing. If the trans-
feree is better off ("has improved his position") on the second date
than he was on the first date, there is, pro tanto, a preference. "Im-
provement of position" is defined as the reduction of a deficiency or its
conversion into a surplus between the two dates.
3 0
26. Professor Countryman referred to Judge Hufstedtler's interpretation as
the "abracadabra" theory. Countryman, supra note 19, at 277.
27. COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 208, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6168.
28. The Committee noted:
The Ninth Circuit's analysis of the problem in DuBay weights the
scales much too heavily on the secured creditor's side, just as much of
the earlier analysis in the law review literature put too much weight in
the opposite scale. The prospects for working through to an intermedi-
ate position between the two extremes through a case law develop-
ment do not appear to be particularly bright. If a fair and sensible
resolution of the underlying policy issues is available, as the Commit-
tee believes it is, a statutory revision is indicated.
Id. at 208-209 (The above-quoted portion of the COMMrrrEE REPORT is omitted
from 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS.).
29. Id. at 215, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6175.
30. Id. at 216, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6176.
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A "deficiency" exists to the extent that the outstanding indebt-
edness exceeds the value of the collateral at the relevant mea-
suring points.31 For example, if four months prior to filing, the
debtor's outstanding indebtedness to a creditor is $10,000 and
the value of the collateral securing that indebtedness is $5,000,
there is a $5,000 deficiency. If, on the filing date, the debt is
$10,000 but the value of the collateral is $7,500, the deficiency is
only $2,500. Using the "improvement of position" test, the
$2,500 improvement is deemed a preference; the trustee may
avoid the creditor's security interest in $2,500 worth of the col-
lateral. Presumably, the Committee hoped this approach
would reasonably protect the expectations of secured creditors
and yet would result in some significant incidences of avoid-
ance that would inure to the benefit of unsecured creditors.
Section 547(c) (5) of the new bankruptcy code, the subsec-
tion that speaks to the inventory and accounts problem, adopts
the basic ideas underlying the "improvement of position" test
of the Committee draft.32 Some modifications, however, did oc-
cur. The language has changed-the phrase "reduction of defi-
ciency" is substituted for "improvement of position." The
preference period is reduced from four months to ninety days
for most cases. One prerequisite for a preferential transfer,
that the creditor reasonably believe the debtor was insolvent at
the time of the transfer, is eliminated. An additional prerequi-
site is present-the preferential transfers must be "to the
prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims." 33 None-
theless, the subsequent drafters and Congress apparently did
not intend any significant substantive change in the basic ap-
proach suggested by the Committee.34 Presumably, the idea of
the intermediate position, giving something to the unsecured
creditors as well as to the secured creditors, tagged along as
well.
Legal scholars have approached the new preference law
from two basic perspectives. 35 First, some commentators have
31. "The term 'deficiency' means the amount by which the debt secured
exceeds the aggregate value of the inventory, receivables, or proceeds which
are collateral for the debt." Id. at 211, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6171.
32. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (5) (1982).
33. Id.
34. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 87-89, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5873-75; IL REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 179,
372-75 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6139-40, 6328.
31; H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 201-02 (1973); see also Gilmore, Con-
fessions of a Repentant Draftwnan, supra note 2, at 628 n.105.
35. See, e.g., Breitowitz, Article 9 Security Interests as Voidable Preferences
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unwrapped the statute, explaining the statutory provisions in
terms of both the simple hypotheticals in which the statute
works quite easily and the more complex hypotheticals in
which the statute works less well.36 Second, other commenta-
tors have explored the prescriptive question whether the pref-
erence provisions ought to have been constructed as they
were.3 7 This latter approach focuses on the balance struck be-
tween the partial undoing of secured parties' expectations as
against the concern for the unsecured creditors and the social
costs of bankruptcy.38 Each perspective, however, carries for-
ward the basic assumption of the Committee that the new pref-
erence law will in fact result in the avoidance of some
significant level of security interests in inventory and accounts
receivable.39 Debate has focused on whether this avoidance is
desirable.
The drafters, Congress, and the commentators all seem to
assume, either explicitly or implicitly, that section 547 would
redistribute assets in some degree from inventory and accounts
secured creditors to unsecured creditors. Yet, evolving case
law under section 547 provides no support for this assumption.
(pts. 1 & 2), 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 357 (1982), 4 CARDozo L. REV. 1 (1982); Cohen,
"Value" Judgments: Accounts Receivable Financing and Voidable Preferences
Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 66 MINN. L REV. 639 (1982); Countryman,
supra note 6; Duncan, Preferential Transfers, the Floating Lien, and Section
547(c) (5) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 36 ARK. L REV. 1 (1982); Har-
rington, Insecurity for Secured Creditors-the Floating Lien and Section 547 of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 447 (1980); Jackson and Kronman,
supra note 5; McCoid, supra note 9; Nimmer, supra note 11; Ward and Shulman,
In Defense of the Bankruptcy Code's Radical Integration of the Preference Rules
Affecting Commercial Financing, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 1 (1983); Note, Avoidance of
Preferential Transfers Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 65 IowA L,
REV. 209 (1979). See generally Coogan, The New Bankruptcy Code: The Death
of Security Interest?, 14 GA. L. REV. 153 (1980) (discussing the effects of Code
provisions other than § 547 on article 9 security interests).
36. See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 35, at 23-29.
37. See, e.g., Jackson & Kronman, supra note 5; McCoid, supra note 9.
38. For a discussion of the social costs of bankruptcy, see Jackson &
Kronman, supra note 5, at 989.
39. See id. at 1001 ("The 'two-point net improvement test' adopted in the
preference section of the proposed Act treats the secured party's expectation
interest less generously [than did the old Act]."); Breitowitz, Article 9 Security
Interests As Voidable Preferences (pt. 2), 4 CARDozo L REV. 1, 60-61 (1982)
("[S]ection 547(c)(5) ... was designed to put a stop to the expansive, and
often fanciful, interpretations that the courts engrafted onto the provisions of
section 60 by substituting a more limited form of protection to the secured
lender, one that more properly accommodates the conflicting interests of un-
secured creditors as well."). But see Duncan, supra note 35, at 45 ("[Section
547's application to security interests in inventory and accounts] has not been
demonstrated to be a serious practical problem.").
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Moreover, certain commercial practices and bankruptcy princi-
ples undercut this assumption.
I1 THE EVOLVING CASE LAW UNDER SECTION 547
Although the new Code has been in effect for almost five
years,4O and the interpretation and application of section 547
has been part of hundreds of bankruptcy court decisions, sec-
tion 547 has apparently to date never been used to avoid secur-
ity interests in inventory or accounts receivable. It does not
necessarily follow from this observation that section 547 has
had no impact on inventory and accounts receivable lenders. It
is, however, an observation worth exploring.
Drawing conclusions from litigated cases is risky. More-
over, considering the typical life span of federal bankruptcy
statutes, the Code is still in its youth.41 Nonetheless, the ma-
turing process has been accelerated by an interesting, contem-
poraneous phenomenon. Along with the enactment of the new
federal bankruptcy scheme, the volume of bankruptcy filings
has increased enormously over the past several years.4 2 This
avalanche of bankruptcy filings has swamped the docket of the
bankruptcy courts and has pushed bankruptcy cases into the
federal court system at an unexpected pace and volume.43
Thus, the litigated cases to date may reflect a Code older than
its years.
Although inventory and accounts lenders have not been
the target of section 547 litigation, section 547 is being used
against creditors with other sorts of article 9 security interests.
Trustees are using section 547 to undo the security interests of
careless creditors who fail to perfect their security interests
promptly.44 The careless secured creditor scenario arises in the
40. The new Code applies, in most part, to bankruptcy filings made on and
after October 1, 1979. PuB. I. No. 95-598, § 402(a), 92 Stat. 2682 (1978).
41. See 2 GILOmRE, SECURITY INTERESTS, supra note 2, § 45.1, at 1282-83 n.3.
Professor Gilmore noted the comprehensive bankruptcy law revisions of 1898
and 1938 and correctly predicted in 1965 that the next comprehensive revision,
"if the old schedule is adhered to," would occur in 1978. Id.
42. COMPTROLLER GENERA, REPORT TO THE CHAmbium, HOUSE CobL ON
THE JuDIcIARY 2-3 (1983) (noting that approximately 450,000 debtors fied bank-
ruptcy in statistical year 1982, compared to approximately 197,000 personal
bankruptcy filings in statistical year 1979).
43. The West Publishing Company's BANiRupTcy REPORTER, which began
publication of selected bankruptcy cases in the latter part of 1979, had pub-
lished 35 volumes by the beginning of 1984.
44. See, e.g., In re Beefeaters, Inc., 27 Bankr. 848 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1983);
In re Vance, 22 Bankr. 26 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983); In re Phillips, 24 Bankr. 712
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1982); In re Davis, 22 Bankr. 644 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982)1 In re
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following manner. Secured creditors who perfect their security
interests at the time they extend value to the debtor receive a
transfer of property, the security interest in the collateral, from
their debtor.45 This transfer, however, is not on account of an
antecedent debt, an essential element of any preferential trans-
fer;6 rather, the transfer results because of the contemporane-
ous extension of value to the debtor. Because the necessary
filing or other act of perfection is often most sensibly done after
the extension of credit, the Code builds in a ten-day grace pe-
riod-perfection within ten days after the extension of credit is
deemed to be a transfer contemporaneous with the extension
of credit and not a transfer on account of an antecedent debt.47
If, however, the creditor perfects after expiration of the grace
period, the transfer is on account of the antecedent debt.48 A
tardily perfected security interest is thereby rendered vulnera-
ble under section 547.
In re Davis49 provides an example of the typical, careless
secured creditor falling prey to section 547. The debtor
purchased a piece of equipment and executed a "Retail Install-
ment Contract" embodying the obligation on the unpaid por-
tion of the purchase price and the security interest in the
equipment to secure the obligation. The creditor filed a financ-
ing statement, perfecting the security interest in the equip-
ment. Unfortunately, the filing did not occur until twenty days
after the creation of the security interest, because the creditor's
employee in charge of filing financing statements was on vaca-
tion. In the subsequent bankruptcy proceeding, which was
commenced within ninety days of the filing of the financing
statement, the trustee avoided the transfer of the security in-
terest, thus relegating the creditor to the status of a general un-
secured creditor.5 O
Enlow, 20 Bankr. 480 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1982); In re Hall, 14 Bankr. 186 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1981); In re Meritt, 7 Bankr. 876 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980); In re Butler, 3
Bankr. 182 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980).
45. See infra text accompanying notes 69-71.
46. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2) (1982).
47. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (2) (A) (1982).
48. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(B) (1982).
49. 22 Bankr. 644 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982).
50. The Davis court rejected the creditor's argument that the exception of
§ 547(c) (1) applied. Section 547(c) (1) shields a "substantially contemporane-
ous exchange." This exception, given its protean language, could be construed
to create a haven for the careless secured creditor who permits a time gap be-
tween attachment and perfection. At least one bankruptcy court has used
§ 547(c) (1) to protect the secured creditor. See In re Arnett, 13 Bankr. 267
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981), aft'd, 17 Bankr. 912 (E.D. Tenn. 1982). The delay in
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Other acts of carelessness on the part of secured creditors
have included filing locally only and not with the central of-
fice,-9 failing to take account of the debtor's change of business
location, thereby rendering a timely filing ineffective,52 and sim-
ply failing to make a timely filing. 3 Creditors lending against
automobiles seem particularly prone to error, perhaps due in
part to the vagaries of the various state departments of motor
vehicles.5 4
Inventory and accounts lenders seem to be a more careful
lot, perhaps because of the substantial sums of money often at
stake in this sort of lending. Nonetheless, In re Ken Gardner
Ford Sales, Inc.5 5 suggests there are exceptions. The creditor
financed the debtor-auto dealer's acquisition of inventory over
a ten-year period. The outstanding debt usually ranged be-
tween one and three million dollars. The creditor maintained a
perfected security interest in the debtor's inventory. At the
time of debtor's bankruptcy the outstanding indebtedness was
$1,921,833.06, presumably fully secured by inventory of at least
that value. Unfortunately, the creditor had paid a filing tax in
connection with the financing statement that reflected only
$1,250,000 in debt. Under the relevant state statute, the financ-
ing statement was ineffective to perfect a security interest in
excess of $1,250,000.56 The creditor's failure to pay the addi-
tional tax (the tax rate was ten cents on each $100 of debt, or
$700 for the $700,000 of additional debt) reduced the secured
claim to $1,250,000. The trustee avoided the creditor's un-
Arnett however, was due to a tardy response from a prior debtor and the "holi-
day mails." The federal court also stressed the particular facts of the case:
When delay beyond the ten day grace period is satisfactorily explained,
as in this case where it was necessary to obtain the release of Ameri-
can National's lien, and no risk of fraud or misrepresentation is occa-
sioned by the delay, the statute should not prevent the courts from
being able to determine that the transaction was substantially
contemporaneous.
17 Bankr. at 914.
51. See, e.g., In re Butler, 3 Bankr. 182 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980).
52. See, e.g., In re B. & L Coal Co., 20 Bankr. 864 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982).
53. See, e.g., In re Enlow, 20 Bankr. 480 (Bankr. S.D. Inld. 1982).
54. See, e.g., In re Haynes, 28 Bankr. 136 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983); In re
Murray, 27 Bankr. 445 (Bankr. MD. Tenn. 1983); In re Brown, 18 Bankr. 956
(Bankr. SMD. Ill. 1982); In re Butz, 17 Bankr. 236 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); In re
Brimhall, 13 Bankr. 942 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1981); In re Independence Land Title,
9 Bankr. 394 (Bankr. ND. Ill. 1981); In re Christian, 8 Bankr. 816 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1981); In re Poteet, 5 Bankr. 631 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980); In re Kelley, 3
Bankr. 651 (Bankr. EM. Tenn. 1980).
55. 10 Bankr. 632 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981), affd, 23 Bankr. 743 (E.D. Tenn.
1982).
56. 23 Bankr. at 745.
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perfected security interest in the additional $700,000 worth of
inventory under the "strong arm" clause of section 544(a),
which permits the trustee to avoid unperfected security inter-
ests, rather than under section 547.57 The trustee used section
547 to avoid over $200,000 in pre-petition payments to the se-
cured creditor.5 8 The trustee avoided these pre-petition pay-
ments under the general principle that payments made within
the preference period to an unsecured or undersecured creditor
are preferential. This use of section 547 was directed at the
payments, not at the security interest. Thus, Ken Gardner is
not an example of the use of section 547 to avoid a security in-
terest in inventory or accounts.
To the extent that the case law to date provides reliable
guidance, careful inventory and accounts lenders need not fear
section 547. Unsecured creditors can expect no "trickle down"
of assets. The case law, however, tells an even grimmer tale for
unsecured creditors. Section 547, while bypassing the inven-
tory and accounts lenders, is being used against unsecured
creditors by the score. Unsecured creditors taking payment or
obtaining liens within the preference period are the most com-
mon victims of section 547.59
57. Id.
58. The creditor's failure to perfect its security interest beyond the
$1,250,000 figure meant that the creditor was undersecured. The trustee, using
§ 547, can recover prepetition payments to an undersecured creditor. See II
U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982).
59. See, e.g., In re Gold Coast Seed Co., 24 Bankr. 595 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982)
(transfer of seed); In re Tonyan Constr. Co., 28 Bankr. 714 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1983) (garnishment of bank account); In re Minton Group, Inc., 28 Bankr. 789
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (attachment); In re Vann, 26 Bankr. 148 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1983) (supplier-creditor's removal of property); In re Ernst, 26 Bankr. 959
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (judgment lien); In re Skinner Lumber Co., 27 Bankr.
669 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982) (payment by check); In re Super Market Distrib.
Corp., 25 Bankr. 63 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (payment by check); In re Advance
Glove Mfg. Co., 25 Bankr. 521 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982) (payment by check); In
re Saco Local Dev. Corp., 25 Bankr. 880 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982) (payment by
check); In re Beck, 25 Bankr. 947 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio) (repossession); In re Is-
bell, 24 Bankr. 234 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982) (payment); In re Caro Prods., Inc., 23
Bankr. 245 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982) (payment); In re Fabric Buys of Jericho,
Inc., 22 Bankr. 1013 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (payment); In re Valles Mech. In-
dus., Inc., 21 Bankr. 542 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982) (payment); In re A.J. Nichols,
Ltd., 21 Bankr. 612 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982) (return of goods); In re Rustia, 20
Bankr. 131 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (payment on credit card account); In re An-
ders, 20 Bankr. 468 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (payment); In re Brown, 20 Bankr.
554 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (payments on credit card account); In re Hersman,
20 Bankr. 569 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982) (payments on credit card account); In re
Darke, 18 Bankr. 510 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982) (payments); In re Ralph A. Veon,
Inc., 17 Bankr. 590 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982) (delivery of coal); In re Griffith, 17
Bankr. 688 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (payment); In re Underwood, 24 Bankr. 501
(Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1982) (judgment lien); In re Maytag Sales & Serv., Inc., 23
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In re Advance Glove Manufacturing Co.60 provides a typi-
cal example of a court's use of section 547 against unsecured
creditors. On December 11, 1980, the supplier-creditor deliv-
ered goods to the debtor. Although the debtor delivered a
check in payment to the creditor on or about January 20, 1981,
the check was not paid by the drawee bank until February 24,
1981. The debtor ified a bankruptcy petition on March 19, 1981.
The transfer of the purchase price by the check was held to be
a preferential transfer. The court found the exception for ordi-
nary course transfers made within forty-five days after the debt
is incurred inapplicable because, it concluded, the "transfer"
occurred when the check was paid (outside the forty-five-day
period) and not when it was delivered (within the forty-five-
day period).61 Thus, a creditor receiving an ordinary course
bona fide payment was forced to give it up because it had the
misfortune of bad timing.
The predominance of unsecured creditors among the sec-
tion 547 victims may be due to the abolition of the "reasonable
cause to believe the debtor was insolvent" element of prefer-
ence. Under the old Act the trustee had to prove that the credi-
tor, at the time of the transfer, had "reasonable cause to believe
that the debtor was insolvent."62 Presumably, this burden dis-
couraged trustees from pursuing many otherwise preferential
transfers, particularly transfers involving relatively small sums
of money.63 Under the new Code, which eliminates the "rea-
Bankr. 384 (Bankr. ND. Ga. 1982) (garnishment of bank account); In re Town
and Country Color Television, Inc., 22 Bankr. 421 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1982) (gar-
nishment of bank account); In re Levine, 16 Bankr. 873 (Bankr. SMD. Fla. 1982)
(judgment lien); In re American Props., Inc., 14 Bankr. 637 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1981) (payment); In re Sportsco, Inc., 12 Bankr. 34 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1981) (pay-
ment by check); In re Utility Stationery Stores, Inc., 12 Bankr. 170 (Bankr. NM.
IlL 1981) (payment); In re Wadsworth Bldg. Components, 10 Bankr. 662 (Bankr.
D. Idaho 1981) (payment by check); In re Peninsula Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc.,
9 Bankr. 257 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981) (payment); In re Burnham, 12 Bankr. 286
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (judgment lien); In re Paolini, 11 Bankr. 317 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1981) (judgment lien); In re Vero Cooling and Heating, 11 Bankr. 359
(Bankr. SMD. Fla. 1981) (judgment lien); In re Pool Masters, Inc., 4 Bankr. 604
(Bankr. SD. Fla. 1980) (transfer of van); In re Duffy, 3 Bankr. 263 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1980) (payment by check); In re Thomas, 7 Bankr. 389 (Bankr. WD.
Va. 1980) (prejudgment attachment).
60. 25 Bankr. 521 (Bankr. ED. Mich. 1982).
61. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (2) (1982).
62. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978) (previously
codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 60b (1976)).
63. See HE.R No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 178, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6139 ("Finally, the requirement that the trustee prove
the state of mind of his opponent is nearly insurmountable, and defeats many
preference actions .... It also defeats the policy of the preference section by
1984]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
sonable cause" element, trustees can use section 547 against
unsecured creditors more easily and appear to be doing so,
even against unsecured creditors receiving relatively small
transfers.6 4
Thus, evolving case law does not support the basic assump-
tion that section 547 would be used against inventory and ac-
count lenders and would thereby be an instrument for asset
redistribution in bankruptcy. Instead, section 547 has ironically
been used against its supposed beneficiaries, the unsecured
creditors.
It is tempting to move from the observation of the absence
of case law examples of the avoidance of security interests in
inventory or accounts receivable to the conclusion that section
547 is in fact not effecting a redistribution of assets to un-
secured creditors. This leap should be resisted, however, for
several reasons. First, case law may still be developing on this
issue; section 547 avoidance cases involving inventory and ac-
counts receivable lenders may be on their way. Second, the
case law may never exhibit any significant level of these sorts
of avoidance actions, and yet the effect may still be there. Sec-
tion 547, like any statute, can have enormous effects not exhib-
ited in the case law. 65 If the parties to a potential bankruptcy
proceeding know or learn about the potential effect of section
547, that knowledge may affect their negotiations. In the negoti-
limiting recoveries to only the most egregious cases."); see also COMMITTEE RE-
PORT, supra note 5, at 204, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6164.
64. See, e.g., In re Bryant, 20 Bankr. 314 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) ($156.00 re-
covered as preference); In re Rustia, 20 Bankr. 131 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982)
($193.00 recovered); In re Hersman, 20 Bankr. 569 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982)
($294.85 recovered); In re Duffy, 3 Bankr. 263 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) ($400.00
recovered).
65. Professor Gilmore has observed:
It is manifestly to the advantage of all creditors, secured and un-
secured, who have claims against an insolvent to keep the foundering
enterprise out of bankruptcy. Everybody knows this. It is much better
for the creditors to reach a negotiated settlement-which may lead to a
salvage operation and which in any case will avoid the crippling ex-
pense of bankruptcy administration. No doubt many more cases are
settled by informal creditors' committees than ever reach the bank-
ruptcy courts. But the tactical situation of a secured creditor in such
negotiations is decisively affected by the status that his security inter-
est will have if the other creditors (or the debtor himself) decide on
the last resort of filing a bankruptcy petition. Thus the theoretical
question whether a security interest is, or is not, vulnerable to the
avoiding powers of the bankruptcy trustee is an intensely practical
question in all cases of actual or threatened insolvency and not merely
in the insignificant minority of cases which, all hope abandoned, go on
to adjudication.
2 GmMORE, SECURrrY INTERESTS, supra note 2, § 45.2, at 1288.
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ated workouts the inventory and accounts receivable lenders
may be giving up part of their secured position because of the
anticipated effect of section 547.66 If so, the effect anticipated
by the drafters, though not evidenced by the case law, may still
be present. It is thus essential to go beyond the case law.
Ill. COMMERCIAL PRACTICES AND BANKRUPTCY
PRINCIPLES
A. COMMERCIAL PRACTICES
Certain practices of creditors generally, including inventory
and accounts receivable lenders, support the conclusion that
section 547 will not pose a serious threat to inventory and ac-
counts lenders. Before considering these practices it is neces-
sary to understand the basic operation of section 547 as applied
to inventory and accounts receivable security interests.
Applying section 547 to any transaction requires a two-step
analysis. First, the elements of a preference as set forth in sec-
tion 547(b) must be satisfied.67 In essence, a section 547(b)
preferential transfer results if, because of a transfer to a credi-
tor made within ninety days prior to the bankruptcy filing and
on account of an antecedent debt, the creditor receives more
than would otherwise have been received in a bankruptcy liqui-
dation. Once the section 547(b) elements are satisfied, the ex-
ceptions set forth in subsection (c) must be examined. The
exception applicable to security interests in inventory and ac-
counts receivable is set forth in subsection 547(c) (5).68
Application of the section 547(b) elements to security inter-
ests in inventory and accounts receivable raises several inter-
esting questions. Inventory and accounts receivable are "quick
assets," typically subject to constant sale or payment and re-
placement by new items of inventory or new accounts. 69 The
preference issue arises with respect to those items of inventory
and accounts that come into the debtor's hands during the
ninety-day preference period. When a debtor gets a new item
of inventory and places that item on its shelf for sale, has there
66. For example, a creditor with a security interest in inventory or ac-
counts receivable who feels vulnerable under § 547 might agree to a negotiated
settlement yielding less than the ostensible secured claim. If the debtor's un-
secured creditors in the settlement received some of that foregone claim, § 547
would produce the assumed effect, notwithstanding the absence of any case
law.
67. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982). The text of § 547(b) is set out at supra note 4.
68. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (5) (1982). See supra note 4.
69. Kronman, supra note 5, at 143-44.
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been a "transfer" to the creditor? From a commonsense, plain
meaning perspective, the question could be difficult. From the
Code perspective, however, it is not. The Code's definition of
"transfer" is incredibly broad.70 Moreover, the drafters' intent
is clear on this issue.7 1 When a debtor receives a new item of
inventory, a security interest in that item of inventory is "trans-
ferred" to the secured creditor.
The "transfer" issue under section 547(b) is not as easily
answered in less usual contexts. If, for example, the items of
inventory have not changed during the preference period but
have simply become more valuable because of a market shift in
the value of the particular commodity, the "transfer" issue
arises and cannot be so easily resolved.72 There is no new item
of inventory and thus no transfer of the security interest in a
new asset. Yet, a security interest in the increased value has
been transferred, in effect, from debtor to secured creditor.
Whether this "transfer" is sufficient for purposes of section
547(b) is unclear.7 3
In re Fairchild74 illustrates the problem. The creditor had
a perfected security interest in, among other assets, the debtor-
farmer's hogs. During the preference period the collateral in-
creased in value in two ways. First, value increased as the hogs
were fattened. Second, the hogs increased in number as a re-
sult of intraherd breeding. The court concluded no "transfer"
had resulted, stating that "[i] n this situation, it is the very na-
ture of the collateral to increase in value." 75 The increase in
value, attributable to the natural instincts of the collateral (pre-
sumably, the court took judicial notice of the propensity of hogs
to eat and breed), did not constitute a preferential transfer.
If the Fairchild rule is extended and followed, the trustee
may not be able to avoid security interests in inventory that
70. "'[T]ransfer' means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or condi-
tional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with
an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest." 11
U.S.C. § 101(41) (1982).
71. Section 547(c) (5) refers specifically to "a transfer. . . of a perfected se-
curity interest in inventory or a receivable." See also CoMMrrrEE REPORT,
supra note 5, at 212, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6172.
72. For example, the market value of gold jewelry inventory in a rising
gold market or citrus fruit inventory in a "killing frosts in Florida" market can
rise, without any change in the particular items of inventory.
73. The Committee apparently assumed that all improvements in position,
whatever the cause, would be preferential. See CoMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note
5, at 216, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6176.
74. 31 Bankr. 789 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
75. Id. at 794.
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has increased in value solely because of market shifts, natural
instincts, or other factors not involving the addition of new
items of inventory. Yet, most inventory and accounts situa-
tions will not pose the Fairchild issue. Typically, there will be
additions to or replacements of inventory and accounts within
the preference period, and the "transfer" element,76 along with
the other section 547(b) elements, will be satisfied.
Once the elements of a preference in section 547(b) are
satisfied, the exceptions set forth in section 547(c) (5) come into
play. To illustrate the basic operation of section 547(c) (5), con-
sider the situation of a creditor having a perfected security in-
terest in the debtor's inventory. Assume that all items of
inventory on the debtor's shelves as of the date of the filing of
the bankruptcy petition were acquired by the debtor within the
ninety days preceding the filing. Under section 547(b), the
transfers of the security interest in all of the items of inventory
constitute preferential transfers.
Section 547(c) (5) shields the creditor's security interest in
the inventory, except to the extent that there has been a reduc-
tion in any deficiency. The "reduction of deficiency" notion has
two basic components. First, there must have been a "defi-
ciency" on the date ninety days preceding the filing of the peti-
tion. The term "deficiency" is shorthand for "any amount by
which the debt secured by such security interest exceeded the
value of all security interest for such debt."7 7 Second, there
must have been a reduction of that deficiency. The components
are conjunctive requirements. If there is no deficiency at the
ninety-day mark, there can be no reduction in deficiency and
the entire security interest in the inventory is excepted from
preferential avoidance. If, however, there is a deficiency on the
first measuring point, the reduction component becomes appli-
cable. The deficiency as measured on the date of the filing of
the petition must be less than the deficiency at the ninety-day
mark. If there is both an initial deficiency and a reduction, the
trustee may avoid the creditor's security interest in the collat-
eral, but only to the extent of the reduction.78
Suppose, for example, that the value of the debtor's inven-
tory at the ninety-day mark is $50,000 and the loan balance at
that time is $100,000. Because there is a $50,000 deficiency, the
76. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
77. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (1982).
78. For the origin of this pro tanto idea, see CommrrEE REPowr, supra note
5, at 216, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6176.
1984]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
first element is satisfied. Assume that the loan balance re-
mains at $100,000 and that the value of the inventory on the
date of the fiing of the petition is $75,000. Thus, there has been
a reduction of deficiency of $25,000 ($50,000 initial deficiency
less the $25,000 deficiency at filing). The trustee may therefore
avoid $25,000 worth of the creditor's security interest in the in-
ventory. Other more complex hypotheticals push the statutory
language harder;79 however, consideration of them is unneces-
sary because such situations suggest, if anything, a "no prefer-
ence" result.8 0 This Article thus will focus on the more
common inventory and accounts problems.
Just as the value of a debtor's accounts receivable or inven-
tory can increase, it can also decrease. The market value of a
particular sort of inventory can shift downward. The price of
gold, for example, can drop dramatically and a jeweler's inven-
tory of gold jewelry can thereby decline in value. A debtor's in-
ventory may be depleted, either by an unexpected turn of
events or in the ordinary course of business. For example, dur-
ing a trucker's strike the inventory of a food store in a rela-
tively remote part of the country might be unexpectedly
depleted. People concerned with the availability of food might
buy out the store's inventory and thereby reduce the value of
the creditor's security interest. A department store's inventory
is routinely depleted during a typical December sales rush; the
value of the department store's inventory it the end of Decem-
ber is often far less than the value of the inventory prior to
Thanksgiving.
A shift in market value or depletion of the debtor's inven-
tory does not, however, necessarily result in a deficiency. Cred-
itors as a rule always demand and receive a cushion of
collateral value in excess of the loan balance.81 A decrease in
79. "Although in the easy case section 547(c) (5) is capable of mechanical
application, understandable even by those of us who have not been schooled in
the new math, it can become almost a medieval instrument of torture when
presented to students by a law professor with an active legal imagination."
Duncan, supra note 35, at 25. Professor Duncan provides a sample of the more
torturous hypotheticals. Id. at 25-29.
80. See id.
81. Creditors seek a cushion of excess collateral value for several reasons.
First, they recognize that collateral value often decreases. Second, they know
that accounts receivable with a face value of a particular amount are not worth
that amount. Costs of collection, even when accounts are paid in the ordinary
course, must be subtracted from the aggregate face value. Inevitably, some ac-
counts will go unpaid. In the case of inventory, the costs of marketing the
goods must be subtracted from their aggregate value. Moreover, creditors typi-
cally resort to collateral only when the business has failed. When a business
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the value of the collateral thus might simply reduce the cush-
ion but stop short of creating a deficiency. In the case of the
expected depletion of a debtor's inventory, as in the December
department store sales rush, a creditor typically takes account
of the anticipated reduction in security in structuring the loan
relationship. Not wishing to risk a deficiency, the creditor
either starts out with a cushion large enough to cover the De-
cember depletion or requires payments during the month of
December sufficient to prevent the existence of a deficiency at
any point in time.82
Deficiencies, nonetheless, will occur. The failing business
sliding into bankruptcy is likely to provide one of those occur-
rences.83 And if the timing is right, a deficiency could exist at
the ninety-day mark. If this happens, the inquiry shifts to the
second element, reduction of the deficiency. A reduction of de-
ficiency will occur if there is an increase in the value of the col-
lateral from the ninety-day mark to the date the petition is
filed. Collateral sometimes does increase in value, as in the
shift in market value situation. As another example, a debtor
may need financing to construct and sell furniture. The
lender's collateral will be the debtor's inventory. The value of
the inventory will increase as the debtor transforms lumber
and other raw materials to completed furniture.84 If this sort of
increase in value occurs during the ninety-day period and is
coupled with an initial deficiency, the trustee may be able to
has failed, collection of the debtor's accounts or sale of its inventory may be
particularly troublesome. Although lending without such a cushion certainly
occurs, creditors generally demand "excess" collateral value. See generally I J.
KUSNET & . ANTOPOL, MODERN BANKING FoRMs § 17.58, at 1-151 (3d ed. 1981)
(banks generally advance only a percentage of "acceptable" accounts receiva-
ble); i&i § 1.72, at 1-197 (forms reflecting percentage of reduction in security
agreements for inventory financing).
82. Payments made to fully secured creditors are generally not preferen-
tial. Such payments fail to satisfy the § 547(b) (5) element of a preferential
transfer because § 547(b) (5) requires that the transfer actually result in a pref-
erence of the creditor, i.e., enable the creditor to receive more than would have
been received in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation without the transfer.
Such fully secured creditors generally receive full payment in a Chapter 7 liqui-
dation, and since full payment is all they can ever receive, the prebankruptcy
payments do not cause the necessary § 547(b) (5) preference effect.
83. See COMMTrrEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 216, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6176 ("In the normal course of a business declining into bank-
ruptcy the position of an inventory or receivable lender, far from improving,
will almost certainly deteriorate.").
84. The drafters did contemplate the situation in which collateral increases
in value through the production process. See id& at 217, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 6177.
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avoid the creditor's security interest, notwithstanding the ex-
ception of section 547(c) (5).
If improvements in the value of the debtor's inventory or
accounts, either of the foregoing sort or some other kind, are
not rare phenomena, and if these phenomena are often linked
with an initial deficiency situation, section 547 might be an ac-
tual threat to accounts and inventory lenders. Yet, section 547
requires the occurence of both events, each not all that unusual
by itself but unlikely to be found in combination with the other.
Typically, a creditor does not purposefully link the increase in
value situation with an initial deficiency. In the lumber-to-fur-
niture example, the creditor would normally require that the
value of the raw materials at their least valuable point be suffi-
cient to cover both the outstanding loan balance and some rea-
sonable cushion. 85 As the lumber is turned into furniture the
increase in the value of the collateral will simply create a
greater cushion or permit the debtor to draw down subsequent
advances. In either case, because the cushion is retained, a de-
ficiency will not arise.
Section 547(c) (5) requires both an initial deficiency and a
reduction of deficiency. The coincidence of the reduction with
an initial deficiency position should be relatively rare. The in-
ventory and accounts receivable lender, as all other commercial
lenders, abhors a deficiency and attempts to structure the rela-
tionship to avoid it under all expected circumstances. More-
over, when a deficiency arises and the debtor winds up in
bankruptcy, the value of the inventory and accounts typically
decreases in value.86
The delicate timing of the section 547(c) (5) test also makes
section 547 an unlikely tool to be used against inventory and ac-
counts lenders. Only the financial pictures at the first measur-
ing point and the date of the filing of the petition are relevant.
A deficiency that does not arise until the eighty-ninth day
before filing or later is irrelevant. Without a deficiency at the
first measuring point, there is no preference and intervening
fluctuations are therefore ignored. 87
85. See supra note 81.
86. See 1 GiumoRE, SECuRrrY INTERESTS, supra note 2, § 8.3, at 259-60.
87. The drafters noted:
Intervening fluctuations in the relationship between debt and collateral
. . are ignored .... The [two-point test] sacrifices a great deal to
simplicity of administration. It seeks to avoid complicated and expen-
sive litigation by focusing the judicial inquiry on the situation as it ex-
isted on the two dates chosen as measuring points. . . . There has to
be a straight policy choice between the rough and ready provisions of
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Furthermore, accounts and inventory lenders could re-
spond strategically to a deficiency by quickly arranging an in-
crease in the collateral value to cover the deficiency, followed
by the debtor's filing of a bankruptcy petition. If the increase
and filing can both be accomplished in less than ninety days,
the creditor's security interest is invulnerable to section 547.88
At some point, however, the Code's fraudulent transfer provi-
sions could apply to this sort of manipulation.89
Certain facts of commercial life thus support the inference,
derived from the case law, that section 547 is not a potent
weapon against inventory and accounts lenders. The necessary
combination of deficiency at the first measuring point and a re-
duction of the deficiency as of the bankruptcy filing is an un-
likely combination.
B. BANKRUPTCY PRINCIPLES
Several bankruptcy principles and features also support
the inference that section 547 will not threaten seriously inven-
tory and accounts lenders. The debtor who engages in borrow-
ing based on inventory and accounts receivable as collateral
will almost certainly be a business debtor. Although most
bankruptcy filings, business and individual, end up in a Chap-
ter 7 liquidation, many business bankruptcies will be resolved
within Chapter 11 reorganizations or Chapter 13 adjustments.90
the Draft (which, it is thought, will work reasonably well in all but the
unusual case) and the desire to do justice case by case (which rnw.y re-
quire tedious, asset-exhausting litigation in all cases).
COMM=sTrE- REPORT, supra note 5, at 216, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws at
6176.
88. For example, assume a creditor has a perfected security interest in the
debtor's accounts. A deficiency first arises on January 1. The creditor per-
suades the financially failing debtor to sell off its inventory and thereby gener-
ate new accounts sufficient to cure the deficiency. The creditor thereafter
persuades the debtor to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition. If all of this oc-
curs before April 1, the creditor's security interest in the pumped-up accounts
is invulnerable under § 547(c) (5) since there was no deficiency at the 90-day
mark.
89. Sections 544(b) and 548 of the Code embody the fraudulent conveyance
avoidance powers. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548 (1982). Section 544(b) in effect in-
yokes the applicable state fraudulent conveyance law. If a prebankruptcy
transfer is avoidable by one of the debtor's unsecured creditors under the state
law, the trustee may avoid the transfer for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate
under § 544(b). Section 548 sets out the Code's fraudulent conveyance rules.
In the illustration supposed in note 88 supra, the transfer of the security inter-
est in the new accounts might be stricken under either § 544(b), depending on
the particlar provisions of the applicable state law, or under § 548, depending
on the trustee's ability to prove that the debtor made the transfer 'with actual
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" other creditors.
90. Professor Eisenberg sets out the following table showing the number
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Certain features of Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 proceedings
suggest that even if section 547 is potentially applicable it may
not be used. First, in these proceedings the bankruptcy estate
will not be liquidated and distributed to the creditors.91 Al-
though section 547 is theoretically applicable and could be used
to enhance the estate in order to facilitate the rehabilitation,
there may be less pressure to invoke it in the nonliquidation
setting. Second, the Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession and the
Chapter 13 debtor, who largely control the bankruptcy process,
may not wish to use section 547.92 The potential section 547 tar-
get may often be a creditor with whom the debtor needs to
work as part of the rehabilitation process. Use or the threat of
use of section 547 against the creditor may be viewed as a slap
in the face to someone whom the debtor needs to keep happy.0 3
If the creditor is in fact a key element in the rehabilitation, the
other creditors, not wishing to offend a necessary participant,
may not object. Morover, other creditors may be potentially
subject to the preference provisions themselves and may all
of bankruptcy filings under Chapters 7, 11, and 13 in fiscal years 1975 through
1982:
Bankruptcy Filings During the Twelve Month Periods Ended
June 30, 1975 through 1982
Chapter
Total
Year Filings 7 11 13 Other
1975 254,484 209,330 3,975 41,178 1
1976 246,549 209,067 3,901 33,579 2
1977 214,399 181,194 3,782 29,422 1
1978 202,951 168,771 3,991 30,185 4
1979 226,476 183,259 3,774 39,442 1
1980 360,957 275,090 5,866 79,996 5
1981 519,063 381,996 8,785 128,281 1
1982 527,811 367,141 16,215 144,444 11
T. EISENBERG, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAw 439 (1984), adapted from ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE U.S. CouRTs, ANNuAL. REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 1982, at 15.
91. Typically, an individual debtor or a firm wishing to avoid liquidation
will seek a Chapter 13 or Chapter 11 proceeding. Nonetheless, a Chapter 13 or
Chapter 11 case may be converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1112, 1307 (1982). Even in a nonliquidation proceeding, some property of the
estate may be distributed to creditors. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(5)(B),
1322(b) (8) (1982).
92. In a Chapter 11 proceeding the debtor firm, the "debtor in possession,"
may retain control of the business and avoid the appointment of a trustee to
run the business. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1982). Similarly, the individual debtor
in a Chapter 13 proceeding may retain substantial control over his or her affairs
and the bankruptcy proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1304, 1321 (1982).
93. See generally Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down
Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 Am. BANKR. L.J. 133, 171 (1979) (noting that
in most Chapter 11 cases the reorganization plan is negotiated and agreed to by
the creditors).
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implicitly or explicitly agree that it shall not be used against
any of them. Courts may be quite willing to accept such an
agreement.94 Thus, the business bankruptcies in Chapters 11
and 13 may not be fertile grounds for invoking section 547.
The Chapter 7 business bankruptcies are presumably those
in which the business has no viable chance to continue.95 Typi-
cally, few nonexempt assets are present in a Chapter 7 case.96
As a result, creditors often do not engage actively in the bank-
ruptcy. And, unless substantial assets can be recovered using
section 547, the trustee will have little interest.97
Interestingly, section 547 is commonly used in Chapter 7,
but not at the behest of creditors and not by trustees. Debtors
are using section 547 to avoid security interests in exempt prop-
erty.98 Under section 522(h), debtors may avoid preferential
transfers of exempt property.99 For example, if wages are paid
over to a garnishing creditor within the preference period, and
those wages in the debtor's hands would be exempt, the debtor
may be able to recover the wages using sections 547 and
522(h).100 Since inventory and accounts receivable typically
will not constitute exempt property, the use of section 547 in
this way has virtually no impact on the inventory and accounts
receivable lenders.101
94. Presumably, so long as the creditors, who typically would be the bene-
ficiaries of an avoidance action, do not press the matter, there would be little
reason for courts to intervene sua sponte.
95. For a description of the "death knell" of a bankruptcy liquidation, see
1A P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN, D. VAGHTS, & J. McDoNNELL, SECURED TRANSACTIONS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9.01, at 972-73 (1983).
96. Id- at 974-75.
97. See infra text accompanying notes 102-105.
98. See, e.g., In re Fagan, 26 Bankr. 212 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (debtor's
use of §§ 522 and 547 to recover garnished wages); In re Walden, 19 Bankr. 901
(Bankr. ED. Tenn. 1982) (garnished wages); In re Cobb, 17 Bankr. 687 (Bankr.
ED. Tenn. 1982) (garnished wages); In re Brengle, 10 Bankr. 360 (Bankr. D.
Del. 1981) (garnished wages); In re Roberson, 7 Bankr. 34 (Bankr. D. Idaho
1980) (debtor's use of §§ 522 and 547 to avoid sheriff's levy and sale of property).
99. 11 U.S.C. § 522(h) (1982) provides:
The debtor may avoid a transfer of property of the debtor or recover a
setoff to the extent that the debtor could have exempted such property
under subsection (g) (1) of this section if the trustee had avoided such
transfer if-
(1) such transfer is avoidable by the trustee under section 544, 545,
547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title or recoverable by the trustee under
section 553 of this title; and
(2) the trustee does not attempt to avoid such transfer.
100. See supra note 98.
101. State law generally exempts certain property from the reach of credi-
tors outside the bankruptcy context. The Code brings state exemption laws
into the bankruptcy context and permits bankruptcy debtors to retain the prop-
erty specified in the applicable state exemption law or the property specified in
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Furthermore, the trustee may choose not to invoke section
547, even where it is potentially applicable. If the cost of prov-
ing and recovering the preference are outweighed by the bene-
fit likely to be recovered, the trustee in his or her discretion
may properly forego use of section 547.102 Thus, the trustee, for
efficiency reasons, may simply choose not to avoid small
preferences.
The trustee's discretionary nonuse of section 547 for effi-
ciency reasons may be more likely in situations involving in-
ventory and accounts lenders than in those involving
unsecured creditors. To prove a preferential transfer to an un-
secured creditor, the trustee need only prove the existence of a
payment within the preference period. 0 3 On the other hand, to
prove a preferential transfer to a creditor with a security inter-
est in inventory or accounts, the trustee must prove the loan
balances and the value of the collateral at the two relevant
points in time.104 Determining the value of inventory or ac-
counts is difficult.105 For example, should accounts be valued
at their face amount, a measure that ignores risks of default
and costs of collection? Should the value of inventory at the
ninety-day mark be determined on the basis of the retail price
marked on items at that time or by the prices at which the
items are eventually sold? Whatever the definition of "value,"
the process of valuation can be costly. This cost may, in effect,
protect the inventory and accounts creditor from the use of sec-
the Code's own list of exempt property. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1982). States may
choose to deny debtors the choice and make the state exemption law the exclu-
sive source of exemptions. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1) (1982). Most states have
made that choice, apparently preferring the commonly less generous state law
list of exempt property. See 3 W. COLLIER, COLER ON BANKRUPTCY 522.02, at
522-11 n.4a (15th ed. 1983). Debtors possessing inventory or accounts receivable
are often corporations. None of the Chapter 7 exemptions apply to corporate
debtors. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1982).
102. Section 547 is cast in permissive terms: "Except as provided in subsec-
tion (c) ... the trustee may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor ...."
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982) (emphasis supplied); see also 4 W. COLLIER, CoLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY 547.01, at 547-9 n.10 (15th ed. 1983).
103. The elements of a preferential transfer will almost invariably be met
once the trustee has proven a payment to an unsecured creditor within the 90-
day preference period. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982). In theory, the unsecured
creditor can defeat the trustee's attack by proving that the debtor was not in-
solvent at the time of the payment. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b) (3), 547(f) (1982).
The unsecured creditor, though the recipient of a preferential transfer, may
also be able to invoke one of the exceptions of § 547(c).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
105. See Cohen, supra note 35, at 651 ("[T]he definition of 'value' can deter-
mine the existence and magnitude of a preference.").
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tion 547 whenever the preference is small.1 06
The assumption of the drafters of section 547 was actually
two-pronged. The drafters assumed, first, that section 547
would be used to avoid security interests in inventory and ac-
counts, and second, that this use of section 547 would result in
greater bankruptcy distributions to unsecured creditors. Evolv-
ing case law, commercial practice, and bankruptcy principles
have undercut the first part of the assumption. If avoidance is
not occurring, or the threat of it is not affecting negotiated set-
tlement, the distribution effect cannot occur. As to the second
part of the assumption, the distribution effect, one final, addi-
tional reason militates against its occurrence. Even if all the
hurdles described are met and the security interest in inven-
tory or accounts is avoided under section 547, the proceeds
from that avoidance are likely to be swallowed up by priority
claimants who stand between the secured creditor and the pool
of general unsecured creditors, the intended beneficiaries of
section 547.107 The exception to this may be the priority wage
106. One final limitation on the use of § 547 to avoid security interests in in-
ventory or accounts should be noted. The trustee may avoid the security inter-
est in inventory or accounts only if the reduction in deficiency is "to the
prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims." 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (5)
(1982). The precise meaning of this peculiar language is unknown. Presuma-
bly, some reductions in deficiency are not to the prejudice of unsecured credi-
tors and hence not avoidable by the trustee. The only certainty is that the
words can operate, if at all, only as a limitation on the avoidance of security
interests in inventory or accounts.
Professor Homer Kripke offered an interpretation of the draft statutory lan-
guage that preceded the "to the prejudice" phrase:
In my opinion the creditor should keep the benefit of the improve-
ments in the cases mentioned, so long as it is not at the expense of
other parties interested in the estate. I think there is a formula for pro-
tecting the other parties against depletion of the estate for the benefit
of the secured creditor in this respect. That formula is found in Mein-
hard, Greeff and Co. v. Edens, 189 F.2d 792 (4th Cir. 1951) which I cited
to Professor Gilmore as a model for this problem on May 31, 1966. The
court was there considering the problem of the allocation between the
secured creditor and the estate of the value of goods which had been in
process at the moment of bankruptcy and which had been finished by
the trustee. The court held that the secured creditor was entitled to
the entire value of the finished goods, less the costs expended by the
trustee in finishing the goods. This of course was for operations which
occurred after bankruptcy. There is no reason why the same principle
may not be applied to expenditures by the bankrupt or debts incurred
by the bankrupt within the four-month period.
COM~nTrEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 210, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
6170-71. The actual interpretation of the vague provision will have to evolve ju-
dicially, notwithstanding Professor Kripke's proposal. See Duncan, supra note
35, at 29-33.
107. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1982); see also 2 GuhiORE, SEcuRrry INTERESTs,
supra note 2, § 45.3, at 1288 ("[T] he real enemy, for a generation or more, has
been the tax collector.").
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claimant, who presumably is part of the set of intended benefi-
ciaries. 0 8 In the typical business bankruptcy, the priority
claimants, including most tax claimants, will probably consume
all of the proceeds of any section 547 avoidance. Thus, the dis-
tribution effect, even when avoidance does occur, is unlikely.
IV. SUGGESTED RESPONSE
The policies that underlie the basic assumption of section
547 are questionable. 0 9 The desirability of shifting wealth from
secured creditors to unsecured creditors is presumably based
on fairness or efficiency grounds."O It may be unfair to permit
the secured creditors to take all when the contributions of the
unsecured creditors often are responsible for a significant part
of the wealth on hand at bankruptcy day."' A distribution pat-
108. Employees enjoy a limited priority status under the Code:
The following expenses and claims have priority in the following
order.
(3) lird, allowed unsecured claims for wages, salaries, or commis-
sions, including vacation, severance and sick leave pay-
(A) earned by an individual within 90 days before the date of the
filing of the petition or the date of the cessation of the debtor's
business, whichever occurs first; but only
(B) to the extent of $2,000 for each such individual.(4) Fourth, allowed unsecured claims for contributions to employee
benefit plans-
(A) arising from services rendered within 180 days before the date
of the filing of the petition or the date of the cessation of the
debtor's business, whichever occurs first; but only
(B) for each such plan, to the extent of-
(i) the number of employees covered by such plan multiplied
by $2,000; less
(ii) the aggregate amount paid to such employees under para-
graph (3) of this subsection, plus the aggregate amount paid by
the estate on behalf of such employees to any other employee
benefit plan.
11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a) (3), (4) (1982).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
110. "Fairness" and "efficiency" are elusive concepts. "Efficiency" theory,
as used in contemporary legal analysis, is a form of consequentialism. The sup-
posed consequences of a contemplated action determine its propriety. Conse-
quentialism dictates taking the action that is likely to generate consequences
that maximize "utility-of-some-sort-or-another-whatever-it-might-be." See So-
per, On the Relevance of Philosophy to Law: Reflections on Ackerman's Private
Property and the Constitution, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 44, 44 n.1 (1979). Legal theo-
rists use "fairness" as a way of suggesting that the rightness of a proposed ac-
tion can be determined apart from its consequences and notions of utility-
maximization.
111. As Professor Gilmore observes:
[Wihy on earth should the fruits of a known insolvent's labors feed the
assignee while all the other creditors starve? . .. [Tihere was some-
thing worth thinking about in the limitations that the nineteenth-cen-
tury courts had placed on the mortgagee's claim to after-acquired
[Vol. 69:39
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tern that gives everything to the secured creditors and nothing
to the unsecured creditors may also be inefficient. If the distri-
bution pattern increases business failures among the unpaid
unsecured creditors, the social costs of bankruptcy may in-
crease."12 An alternative distribution pattern that enhances the
distributions to unsecured creditors may thus produce fewer
social costs.
The fairness argument against the current distribution pat-
tern is founded on the important, often unarticulated premise
that unsecured creditors either (i) do not know ab initio their
likely bankruptcy distributions or (ii) are powerless to struc-
ture their credit terms to reflect the risk.113 Yet, many un-
secured creditors are perfectly aware of the probable outcome
in bankruptcy and rationally take that into account when struc-
turing the price for their credit." 4 To the extent that un-
secured creditors charge more for credit than do secured
creditors, it is perhaps not unfair for them to receive less in
bankruptcy. In a sense, the unsecured creditors have received
their bankruptcy distributions up front in the form of higher
prices charged for credit. This explanation obviously may not
work in any particular instance." 5 Nonetheless, it is applicable
property: does it make any sense to award everything to a secured
party who stands idly by while a doomed enterprise goes down the
slippery slope into bankruptcy?
Gilmore, Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, supra note 2, at 627.
Professor Gilmore expressed the hope that § 547 would correct this prob-
lem. He also noted the "touch of irony" in the fact that some of the drafters of
article 9, the creators of the "floating lien," were responsible in part for the
early draft of § 547. "It cannot often have happened in the history of codifica-
tion that draftsmen have received a second chance to clean up the mistakes
that they made the first time around." IcL at 628.
112. See Jackson and Kronman, supra note 5, at 989.
113. The premise is stated in simplified terms. The fairness argument could
raise questions about the appropriate focus (unsecured creditors as a group or
individually), the knowledge point (actual or constructive knowledge), power
(at what point is one "powerless"), and other issues. This Article does not, and
need not, address these complications. Whatever unfairness may exist in the
distribution pattern, this Article concludes that tinkering with the preference
law is not a sensible or effective response. See infra text accompanying notes
117-21.
114. Consider, for example, the differing interest rates charged the same
debtor for secured and unsecured loans. The interest rate on home mortgage
loans is normally less than the interest rate on credit card loans. Although
other factors are involved, the creditor's recognition of the effect of security (or
its absence) in bankruptcy is surely part of the explanation of the differing
rates.
115. For example, a particular unsecured creditor might extend a large
amount of unsecured credit at a high interest rate to one particular debtor. If
the debtor falls into bankruptcy before the creditor has had an opportunity to
spread its credit over a larger group of debtors, most of whom will most likely
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to the unsecured creditors as a class and over time. And this is
presumably all that could be realistically expected of any fed-
eral bankruptcy scheme. If in the usual case unsecured credi-
tors are treated fairly, the complaint of the exceptional
unsecured creditor probably will have to be tolerated in any
system.
The fairness argument persists, however, in one particular
situation, that of the employee-creditor. An employee extends
credit to his or her employer because of the phenomenon of
paying wages in arrears. The paycheck received today usually
represents the work done over the previous week or month. In
this way employees can become unsecured creditors of a bank-
rupt debtor-employer. If these employees were either unaware
of their status in bankruptcy or unable to demand that this fea-
ture of their status be taken into account in setting the price for
their labor, the distribution pattern in bankruptcy as applied to
the employees might be unfair.116
Although some employees may not fit the "no bargaining
power" model, the drafters of the new Code seem to have ac-
cepted to some extent this fairness argument. Employees'
wage claims enjoy a limited priority in bankruptcy."17 This pri-
ority status does the employees little good, however, if, as is
often the case, all of the assets are swallowed up by the se-
cured claimants. Thus, the bankruptcy distribution scheme
perhaps should provide more for the employee-creditors, as a
matter of fairness. The current priority status, moreover, may
be an insufficient response to this problem.
The essential question then becomes how to respond to
this perceived unfairness. One possibility is to amend section
547 to put more inventory and accounts receivable security in-
terests at risk and thus increase the application of section 547
to those creditors. This response, however, would be crude and
ultimately ineffective. First, the needy employee-creditors will
not always be linked with a substantial amount of inventory
avoid failure, the creditor may itself fail, notwithstanding the higher interest
rates charged for the unsecured credit.
116. The independent, individual employee typically will know nothing of
bankruptcy distribution patterns until it is too late for him or her to do any-
thing about it. Even if the employee acquires first-hand knowledge, however,
in virtually all cases the employee will lack the power to demand security for
the wages. The presence of labor unions complicates the picture. National la-
bor unions with legal staff presumably have knowledge of the legal status of
wage claims in bankruptcy. How, or whether, they use the knowledge is
unclear.
117. See supra note 108.
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and accounts acquired by the debtor within any reasonable
preference period. For example, if the debtor's assets consist
primarily of equipment, a form of collateral that usually is not
subject to rapid turnover, putting teeth into section 547(c) (5)
would do no good. Employee-creditors might still receive no
bankruptcy distributions, even under a revised section 547.
Moreover, using section 547 to avoid security interests in inven-
tory and accounts may benefit substantially nonemployee un-
secured creditors, creditors who presumably have the
knowledge and power to take care of themselves. To use sec-
tion 547 to transfer assets from the inventory and accounts
lenders to these sorts of unsecured creditors would likely
amount to merely substituting one form of unfairness for an-
other. Explicitly limiting section 547 avoidance of security in-
terests in inventory and accounts to the needs of employee-
creditors would solve these objections.11 8 It would also create a
commercially undesirable state of uncertainty, however. Inven-
tory and accounts creditors would have to rely on the absence
of unpaid wage claims, a condition over which the creditor typi-
cally has no control and one over which the creditor could gain
control only at enormous cost and inconvenience.119
Amending section 547 to put inventory and accounts secur-
ity interests at greater risk, as a means of shifting wealth from
secured to unsecured creditors, may be necessarily ineffectual
Commentators have questioned the notion that legal rules can
redistribute wealth in contractual settings.120 In the section 547
context, secured creditors could respond strategically to any
new rule by insisting on terms and conditions that negate the
risks imposed by a redrafted section 547.121 For example, a re-
118. For example, a redrafted § 547 could provide for avoidance of security
interests in inventory and accounts to the extent necessary to provide funds to
pay any wage claims in the particular bankruptcy proceedings.
119. Theoretically, a secured creditor could monitor the debtor's payroll
process, assuring to some degree payment of the wages. Effective monitoring
of the payroll, however, could be quite costly when, for example, there are
many employees spread over multiple job sites.
120. See, e.g., A. PoLNscY, AN INTRODUCnTON TO LAW AN EcoNobucs 107-10
(1983); Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13,
16-18 (1972) (in contractual settings with low transaction costs, the rule's redis-
tributive effect is likely to be blunted); Epstein, The Social Consequences of
Common Law Rules, 95 HAnv. L REv. 1717, 1720 (1982) (parties' subsequent
conduct can undo a rule's ostensible wealth transfer effect).
121. Professor Polinsky describes the phenomenon in the context of the
choice of legal rules for remedies for breach of contract:
In general, the parties will take any distributional effects of breach of
contract remedies into account when setting the contract price; thus,
how the joint benefits of entering into the contract are shared between
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drafted section 547 that increased the preference period would
put a larger chunk of inventory and accounts at risk. Yet, if the
"deficiency" element were retained, secured creditors could re-
spond by terms and conditions that made deficiencies less
likely to occur. Even if the statute were drafted to impose ab-
solute forfeitures on secured creditors (for example, by making
avoidable security interests in all inventory or accounts ac-
quired within ninety days of bankruptcy), a redistribution of
wealth may not occur. Secured creditors might respond to this
real and unavoidable increase in risk by increasing the cost of
their credit. If unsecured creditors in fact would benefit from a
redrafted statute, debtors would demand lower interest rates
from unsecured creditors. The parties would take into account
the change in risks and, by their contracts, offset any redistrib-
utive effects of a new statute.
A direct subsidy would be a better response to the unfair
treatment of employees and other unsecured creditors. 2 2 If
employees receive too little in bankruptcy distributions, the
simplest response is to pay these employees directly. The reve-
nue pool from which these payments would be made could be
created out of the debtor's assets in bankruptcy so that all
creditors would share in the creation of the pool of funds, al-
though this would have obvious implications for the pricing
structure of credit in our society. Alternatively, the revenue
pool could be created out of tax revenues, either general tax
revenues or a tax on employees' wages generally. Such a sys-
tem already exists to a degree in several government entitle-
ment programs.123 Whatever system is adopted to create the
revenue pool, the spreading of this cost could be dispersed
among a wider group of people than the group of employees
unfortunate enough to end up working for a business that goes
bankrupt.
A difficulty with the direct subsidy approach is that it
would carry with it an unknown set of effects. For example, if
wage claims are underwritten, employees may stay on the job,
the parties depends primarily, if not exclusively, on their relative bar-
gaining strengths, not on the remedies available to them.
A. POLINSKY, supra note 120, at 108-09.
122. A direct subsidy system, however, will generate administrative costs.
Redistribution of wealth by subsidy may also create inefficiencies. See infra
text accompanying note 124; see also A. PoLisKy, supra note 120, at 105-07.
123. Obviously, the contemporary American welfare system is imperfect. If
social programs ever reach the point of assuring all citizens a decent standard




despite the hopeless insolvency of the firm, and thereby only
prolong the existence of the firm. The longer the firm stays in
existence, the greater may be the amount of other unsecured
and unpaid debt.124 Thus, direct subsidy may solve one prob-
lem only at the cost of creating others.
Although fairness notions might suggest a need for a
change in the current bankruptcy distribution pattern, section
547 and the inventory and accounts creditors are the wrong
tools to use. Direct subsidy, although seemingly a more effec-
tive and fairer tool, must be evaluated with a consideration of
its collateral effects.
The efficiency argument for redrafting section 547 can be
addressed in much the same way. If the present bankruptcy
distribution scheme in fact increases the social costs of bank-
ruptcy to an inefficient level, the problem is in choosing the ap-
propriate tool for response. The preference tool is too crude. It
depends upon the coincidence of the essential factual elements
and the trustee's exercise of discretion in choosing to use the
tooL Moreover, creditors are likely to respond to an amended
preference provision by strategies designed to avoid the impact
of the amended provision. Such strategic behavior will itself
generate additional costs.125 Finally, the preference tool may
be ultimately ineffectual to shift these costs from unsecured
creditors to secured creditors. If section 547 is redrafted to im-
pose real risks on secured creditors and correspondingly real
benefits on unsecured creditors, the parties may simply adjust
the price of credit so that the unsecured creditors still bear the
existing costs, in the form of lower interest rates traded off for
higher bankruptcy distributions. This, of course, might have an
insurance effect: unsecured creditors would be paying premi-
ums in the form of lower interest rates to protect themselves
against catastrophic losses in a bankruptcy.126 Yet, most un-
secured creditors extend credit to multiple debtors and thereby
already have an insurance policy of sorts. So long as only a few
124. See supra notes 5 & 12.
125. If the strategic behavior is generally successful in avoiding the impact
of the amended preference provisions, a redrafted provision would produce
only the additional costs of the strategic behavior and not the redistribution
effect.
126. This insurance effect is of course possible under any bankruptcy distri-
bution pattern. In essence, the unsecured creditor is always a self-insurer try-
ing to build up a reserve against future losses in a debtor's bankruptcy.
Changes in the bankruptcy distribution pattern merely alter the risks and
thereby alter the reserve requirements.
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of their debtors go bankrupt, unsecured creditors should be
able to sustain the losses.
Finally, any amendment of section 547 would be costly.
First, there are the obvious and common costs of any statutory
revision, for example, the time and effort of drafting commit-
tees, congressional committees, and the members of Con-
gress.127 Second, an amended section 547 would certainly give
rise to its own new and peculiar problems. A virtue of the ex-
isting provision is that it is moving into its adolescence. The af-
fected parties, debtors and creditors alike, presumably have
some sense of the nature of this statute and have made neces-
sary adjustments. Any revision would trigger costly readjust-
ments by the players. Thus, although the present distribution
scheme may be either unfair or inefficient, the preference pro-
vision is an inappropriate tool to use to combat these ill effects.
V. CONCLUSION
The drafters and early critics of section 547 based their
analyses on a mistaken assumption. Security interests in in-
ventory and accounts receivable are not at serious risk. The
desired redistribution of wealth to the unsecured creditors will
not occur. Despite this mistaken assumption, however, section
547 should not be redrafted. Although the efficiency and fair-
ness issues remain unresolved, redrafting section 547 would be
a problematical response.
When people set out to create a law for the future, they
must make assumptions about future effects. Because we can-
not predict the future, the assumptions sometimes will turn out
to be wrong. Yet, we should not abandon the effort rationally
to construct new law; we should simply be aware of our
limitations.
127. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, for example, represents over a
decade of work. The Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970),
effective July 24, 1970, established the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States, beginning the formal process of redrafting. The actual pro-
cess of redrafting began even earlier; the Gilmore Committee, for example, be-
gan work in 1966.
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